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AT T H E L I M I T S O F A MASS M O V E M E N T : T H E CASE O F 
T H E S U D E T E N G E R M A N P A R T Y , 1933—1938 
Von Ronald M. S melser 
In špite of the plethora of materiál which has been written on political mass 
movements for the past several decades, the question of the appeal of strongly 
nationalist mass movements such as fascism continues to elude and fascinate. 
From a scholarly Standpoint, part of the difficulty in treating mass movements 
lies in the problém of how to approach the phenomenon. Particularly, there seems 
to be a myopic concern with the dramatically successful mass movements in 
politically powerful states — the most obvious examples being the fascist move-
ments in Italy and Germany. To some extent this emphasis is understandable and 
legitimate: political success on such a large scale in itself merits the closest of 
scrutiny. The pitfall comes, however, when such a Great-Power approach to mass 
movements is applied to the study of such movements in many of the smaller 
European countries. 
In some ways, of course, it is essential to look at smaller European political 
mass movements in terms of what happened in the more powerful neighboring 
states. It would be foolhardy to neglect the magnetic effect of German and Ita-
lian fascism: movements which inspired imitation and thereby mitigated the sui 
generis nature of other fascisms. Yet, „imitation" theories can become misleading 
if such studies become so preoccupied with similarities on a surface level that the 
unique, indigenous underpinnings of the smaller mass movements are obscured or 
evcn distorted. Such appears to have been especially the case with studies of the 
mass movement which sprang up among the Sudeten Germans during the 1930s. 
On October 3, 1933, a politically unknown former calisthenics teacher and 
bank employee, Konrad Henlein, called into existence a political movement, the 
Sudeten German Heimatfront (Home Front), with the intent of uniting all the 
Germans in Czechoslovakia within a single political Organization. The proclama-
tion, coming as it did directly on the heels of the dissolution of the Sudeten Ger-
man National Socialist Party (DNSAP) and the smaller right wing German Na-
tionalist Party, led many observers of rightist politics in Czechoslovakia to 
assume that this new Henlein Front was just that — merely a kind of ersatz or 
„front" Organization for the Sudeten Nazi Party which had come under such 
heavy fire from the Czechs. By May 1935, just a ycar and a half after its foun-
ding, the Henlein party had grown to the point where it attracted 1,249,530 
votes — more than any other party, German or Czech, in the Czechoslovakian 
generál elections1. By 1938, scarcely five years after its inception, the Henlein 
1
 For statistics on the election, see B r u e g e l , Johann Wolfgang: Tschechen und Deut-
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movement became the primary tool with which Hitler was able to destroy the 
Czechoslovakian State from within. 
The growth of the Henlein movement from obscure political Organization to 
sucessful mass party to manipulated fifth column remains a complicated problém 
for the historian. Despite numerous studies, there is still doubt regarding what 
attracted Sudeten Germans in such large numbers and so quickly to the move­
ment for ethnic unity 2 . Superficially the resemblances between the Hitler and 
Henlein movements seem so overwhelming that some historians even go so far 
as to assume that Henlein and his party were merely puppets of the Reich regime 
from the outset3. Others see the Henlein Front primarily as a Surrogate for the 
several radical nationalist Sudeten parties which came before it, including the 
former Sudeten Nazi Party 4 . Although purportedly the goal of Sudeten Volks­
gemeinschaft (ethnic Community) was the primary impetus for the founding of 
the Henlein movement, some critics maintain that the Germans in Czechoslovakia 
were in reality looking beyond the borders into the Third Reich when trfey 
flocked to Henlein. The links between the growth of the Henlein movement and 
the Hitler regime in the years 1933—1938 have been stressed so extensively that 
Hitler's dramatic successes during these years has often been offered as the main 
factor in Henlein's own precipitate rise from obscurity. Even in the more balan-
ced historical studies on Munich and the Sudeten Germans, the growth of the 
Hitler movement in the Third Reich continues to overshadow developments in 
Central Europe during the 1930s. 
One stumbling block to assessing the intricacies of the Henlein Sudeten move­
ment and its ties to its Hitlerian counterpart has beeen the relative inaccessibility 
of the necessary materials. For a brief period in 1968, however, archival materials 
consisting in part of statistics gathered by the Sudeten German Heimatfront itself 
during the 1930s were made available — documents which shed light on the 
whole phenomenon of fascism among the Sudeten Germans. The materials con-
sist primarily of sometimes fragmentary documents detailing the regional and 
national membership growth of the Henlein movement during the 1930s, as well 
sehe. Munich 1967, p. 265—269; also L u z a , Radomir: The Transfer of the Sudeten 
Germans. Cincinnati 1964, S. 80—81. The distribution of seats after the election was 
such that the Sudeten German Party, although it had reeeived the largest number of 
votes cast, reeeived 44 mandates as opposed to 45 for the second largest vote-getter, 
the Czech Agrarian Party. 
2
 The most important studies on the Henlein movement are L u z a : Transfer; B r u e -
g e l : Tschechen; Č e r n ý , Bohumil / C é s a r , Jaroslav: Politika německých bur-
žoazních stran v Československu v letech 1918—1938. 2 vols. Prague 1962. The Luza 
work is the more balanced; documentation in Bruegel and in Černý and César is ex­
tensive. 
3
 This is especially true of B r u e g e l : Tschechen. Note, however, that even Czech 
historiography is abandoning this extreme position. See, for example, O l i v o v á , Věra: 
The Doomed Democracy: Czechoslovakia in a Disrupted Europe, 1914—1938. Trans. 
George Theiner. Montreal 1972, p. 191 ff.; also O l i v o v á ' s article: Kameradschafts­
bund. Z Českých Dějin: Sborník Práci in Memoriam Prof. Dr. Václava Husy. Prague 
1966, p. 237—268. 
4
 Typical of this interpretation is O 1 i v o v á : Democracy. 
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as párty structural growth (Ortsgruppen formation) during the samé period5. On 
the basis of these statistics it is possible to learn much about overall growth trends 
in the movement from 1933—1938, geographic distinctions affecting the move-
menťs growth, and social and economic factors relating to the expansion of the 
Sudeten German Party: evidence which strongly suggests that the Henlein move­
ment cannot be dismissed as a mere imitation of the National Socialist movement 
in the Reich. Nor it seems can Henlein's success be explained solely in terms of 
parallels to the rise of the Hitlerian regime. Rather the Sudeten German move­
ment must be first approached from a sui generis standpoint if its significance is 
to be fully understood and if the relationship of the Reich and Sudeten fascist 
movements is to be correctly assessed. 
I t is revealing at the outset to look briefly at some of the Statistical materiál 
bearing on the very earliest period of the Henlein movemenťs growth: particu-
larly in the interest of pinpointing the identity of the first party activists. Were 
the original supporters of the Henlein movement merely Sudeten National So-
cialists in disguise or was the party success, as Henlein and his fellow Front 
leaders claimed, a sign of spontaneous support from the neglected little man on 
the periphery of Sudeten politics? Here, a comparison between party growth in 
terms of Ortsgruppen (local organizational units) and individual membership is 
significant. By December 1933, two months after Henlein proclaimed the for­
mation of the Heimatfront, a fairly constant growth ratio develops: with the 
formation of each new Ortsgruppe, about 100 new members are added to the 
party itself (Charts 1—2). But during the first two months of the new move­
menťs existence, this pattern does not apply. In October, the month the Front 
was founded, 9,500 Sudeten Germans reported as new members, whereas only 
four Ortsgruppen were organized. The following month membership rose to over 
10,000, but still only 55 Ortsgruppen had been formed. Only beginning with De­
cember was the 1 : 100 ratio reached which applied thereafter, as 94 Ortsgruppen 
corresponded to nearly 11,000 in overall membership. This early growth pattern 
suggests that it was not a well organized recruiting process which drew the initial 
Henlein party membership: otherwise there would probably háve been a sizeable 
net of Ortsgruppen from the outset with a proportionately lower total member­
ship. Indead membership totals were initially higher in proportion to the number 
of local party units (9,500 to 4). The development of an organizational frame-
work followed only after the initial influx of members into the movement. 
Considering the fact that the Henlein movement only existed on páper initially 
— as the result of a formal public proclamation — the first surge of members 
into the party seems rather large. Either there must háve been a latent politically 
interested membership potential for such a movement at this particular point in 
time or these members could háve already been part of some other similar Organi­
zation prior to this point. Otherwise it would háve hardly been likely that 9,500 
5
 Most important are two charts, „Mitgliederstand 1933—1935" and „Ortsgruppengrün­
dungen", covering the samé period. The charts appear to háve originated in the Sta­
tistische Abteilung des Werbeamtes der Sudetendeutschen Partei. Státní Ústřední Archiv 
(hereafter SUA). Prague, 5-HS-OA/://: 14. 
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Sudeten Germans would have found their way into the movement so quickly. 
There are several possible groups which come into question as sources of this ini­
tial membership: members of the recently dissolved right wing parties or members 
of Henlein's own ostensibly apolitical gymnastic assocation (Sudetendeutscher 
Turnverband). Czech scholars claim that there is evidence that in Moravia at 
least roughly 41.5 percent of the Henlein Front membership emerged from the 
ranks of the disbanded Sudeten Nazi party 6 . On the surface it might seem that 
since nearly half of the initial members of the Henlein movement may have been 
fugitives from the suddenly defunct Nazi party, the Henlein party was delibera-
tely founded to serve as a „respectable" substitute. Yet closer examination seems 
to indicate that this Interpretation is a questionable one. If Henlein had indeed 
been in close ties with the former National Socialist Party leaders, it would have 
been only too easy for the new Front to build on the organizational core of the 
Natinal Socialist Party, rather than relying on a random influx of members. But 
evidence suggests that Henlein did not in fact také advantage of the disbanded 
Nazi party structure7. As of May 1932, a year before its dissolution, the Sudeten 
National Socialist Party claimed to have 1,024 Ortsgruppen*. Compared to this 
kind of widespread net of local political cells, the beginnings of the Henlein 
Front seem modest indeed: initially there were only two Ortsgruppen; two 
months later, only 55 such local units. It took more than a year — until January 
1935 '— for the Henlein Front Ortsgruppen totals to pass the 1,000 mark 9 . 
The very gradual increase in Ortsgruppen suggests that although Henlein 
might certainly have hoped that the dissolution of the other right wing parties 
would improve chances of success for his newly proclaimed movement, he was 
not calculatedly using the National Socialist Party power base as a foundation 
for his movement or conspiring with former Nazi leaders to speed party growth. 
The lack of wholesale organizational duplication between the Sudeten Nazi party 
and the Henlein Front would also tend to support contentions that Henlein's 
movement was not merely an Ersatz for more radical political organizations, but 
rather represented what it claimed to be: an independent new political Organi­
zation for rallying the Sudeten population 1 0. Henlein and his closest associates 
6
 See Č e r n ý / C é s a r : Politika II, 225 footnote 46. 
7
 For detailed background on the dissolution of the Sudeten National Socialist Party 
and the formation of the Heimatfront see S m e 1 s e r , Ronald: The Sudeten Problem, 
1933—1938. Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy. Middle-
town/Connecticut 1975, chapter III. 
8
 P f i t z n e r , Josef: Sudetendeutsche Einheitsbewegung. 2nd ed. (Karlsbad and Leipzig 
1937, p, 55. From January to June 1932 the Sudeten National Socialist Party claims 
to have recruited 14,000 new members and added 110 Ortsgruppen. Völkischer Beobach­
ter, No. 155, June 3, 1932. 
9
 This would tend to refute O l i v o v á : Democracy 191, which claims that the Henlein 
movement took over the organizational structure of the Sudeten German National So­
cialist Party. 
10
 The fact that the Henlein movement was plagued throughout its brief history by 
serious power struggles often preeipitated by former Sudeten German National So-
cialists seems to give strength to this interpretation. See S m e 1 s e r : Sudeten Problem, 
chapter V. 
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continued not only to stress the uniqueness and independence of their movement, 
but insisted that their approach to ethnic politics was more moderate than that 
of the National Socialistsu. But although Henlein himself may have genuinely 
seen his new movement in such moderate terms, this seif image appears to have 
been not wholly accurate. If Czech estimates are correct and if such sizeable 
numbers of former Sudeten National Socialists flocked into the new movement, 
then a substantial percentage of the initial Front membership would have pro-
bably hoped that their political involvement would be of a militant, rather than 
a moderate nature. This discrepancy between what the Henlein movement leader-
ship intended and what many of the rank and file members possibly expected — 
so often dismissed as merely an example of duplicity and deception on Henlein's 
part — helps to explain why the „moderate" leadership within the Front later so 
consistently underestimated the strength of the radical thrust which developed 
among formeř Sudeten National Socialists who had joined the Henlein move­
ment 1 2. 
As Charts 1—2 indicate, the growth of the Sudeten German movement after 
1933 is a steady one, with two periods of spurt in membership — one in 
spring of 1935, the other in spring of 1938. The first such period of sudden, 
massive expansion came at a time when national elections were being held in 
Czechoslovakia, elections out of which the Henlein party emerged as the largest 
vote-getter in Czechoslovakia. In analyzing the significance of this first major 
surge in party membership, one thing seems clear: the tremendous growth period 
in early 1935 would not appear to be primarily a result of the election success 
itself — or, in other words, it would not seem to be analogous to the „March 
violet" influx into the Reich National Socialist Party following Hitler's rise to 
power in 1933. Rather, most of the growth came just prior to the elections, 
during a period of great tension and difficulty for the party, at a time when 
there was considerable doubt as to whether the Henlein Organization would even 
be allowed to také part in the election at all. In January 1935 party membership 
stood at 107,785. By April (still one month before the unexpected success in the 
elections and in the midst of the crisis over election participation and the enfor-
ced name change of the Henlein movement from „Front" to „Party") membership 
had climbed to 204,401. In short, membership had nearly doubled in just three 
months. Two months later, at the beginning of June, when the Henlein electoral 
triumph of May 19th had barely had time to register, membership had risen 
sharply once again to 370,000. Following this massive influx of members prior 
to the elections, growth feil off dramatically. From July to October 1935, less 
11
 See, for example, Henlein's Böhmisch-Leipa declaration of October 21, 1934. Koch to 
Auswärtiges Amt, October 22, 1934. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn, 
Pol. IV/Politik 6/Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker/vol. 23 (Herecrafter cited as PA). 
12
 The radical direction was especially represented by Karl Hermann Frank, a minor 
publisher and former Sudeten National Socialist member who later gained notoriety 
for his brutal treatment of Czechs during the Protektorat. See Czechoslovakian Ministry 
of Information, Česky Národ Soudí K. H. Franka. Prague 1947. 
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than 14,000 names were added to the membership rolls. It took until May 1937, 
an additional 17 months, for membership to reach the 500,000 mark. 
If this 1935 growth spurt prior to the May elections is not attributable to a 
Me-too-ism similar to the rush into the Reich National Socialist Party after 1933, 
then why this sudden influx in membership at this point? Many thought at this 
time that is was the lodestar of Hitler's Germany that drew Sudeten Germans to 
Henlein. A short while after the elections, as Sudeten German Party Senators and 
representatives took their places in parliament, one deputy shouted at them that 
they could now proceed to do what their constituents had elected them to do: to 
deliver Czechoslovakia into Hitler's hands13. Numerous modem scholars have 
agreed that strong electoral support for the Henlein movement in 1935 did in-
dicate a widespread sympathy for Hitler's regime among the Sudeten populace 
and one could certainly point to Hitler's political victories during early 1935 as 
evidence to support such a claim. To be sure, Hitler's political coups in the 
months prior to the Sudeten elections — the return of the Saar to the Reich in 
January and the reintroduction of military conscription in Germany in March 
— could not have helped but foster stronger feelings of ethnic solidarity among 
the Sudeten electorate14. But an analysis of Sudeten party growth patterns during 
this period suggest that the Sudeten population was not thoroughly radicalized 
in its support of Henlein at this point. Moreover, international considerations 
probably played only a peripheral role in influencing the 1935 elections: rather, 
the political climate within Czechoslovakia itself seems to have primarily trigge-
red the wave of support for the Henlein movement at this point. 
One piece of evidence which de-emphasizes the international Situation as a 
factor in Sudeten German Party membership growth in 1935 is the fact that the 
rapid membership spurt peaked before the elections, not after. If there was indeed 
a mood of euphoria among the Sudeten populace as a result of Hitler's successes 
in early 1935, and if this were indeed a central influence behind the stunning 
electoral success of Henlein's party, then it would seem likely that the election 
victory of the Sudeten party would in itself have triggered yet another massive influx 
of members into the party. Such a triumph for the Sudeten ethnic community 
would have logically only intensified any supposedly widespread feelings of soli-
darity with the radical German nationalist cause. Sudeten Party membership 
figures, however* suggest that such a euphoric, success-oriented mood was not 
prevalent among Sudeten Germans at this time. Within a month of the electoral 
triumph, new membership gains trailed off to a fraction of the growth rate prior 
to May 19th. Whereas 350,000 joined the party in the four months before and in 
the month during and 2 weeks just after the May election, it took an additional 
four months for just 14,000 further names to be added to the party membership 
13
 The Statement is from Wenzel Jaksch, German Social Democrat, as quoted in B r u e -
g e l : Tschechen 268. 
14
 On the larger foreign policy implications of these two steps taken by Hitler see J a -
c o b s e n , Hans-Adolf: Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 1933—1938. Frankfurt 
1968, p. 327—328; and W e i n b e r g , Gerhard: The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Ger-
many. Chicago 1972, chapters 7—8. 
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rolls1 5. In short, although sizeable, the support for Henlein's party at the poliš in 
itself does not seem to point to a climate of rapidly mounting radicalization or 
political hysteria among the Sudeten electorate. 
In this respect it is revealing to explore the relationship between party Orts­
gruppen growth and generál membership increases during this period. Prior to 
June — i. e. before the elections — the sudden increase in party members was 
paralleled by an equally large increase in the number of Ortsgruppen. Both local 
Organization totals and individual membership totals nearly tripled in the period 
from January to June. In other words, the growth spurt represented not only an 
increase in individual membership, but a dramatic geographic expansion of the 
party's base as well; with nearly 2000 new Ortsgruppen being organized in just 
four months. Although international factors such as Hitler's successes could con-
ceivably have been behind some of this growth, a more immediate reason for 
this geographic expansion would seem to lie in the fact that at precisely this 
point in 1935 certain artificial political curbs on Sudeten German Party growth 
were eliminated, opening up new areas of the Sudetenland to recruitment acti-
vities by Henlein and his followers. 
Since mid—1934 an informal agreement had existed between the Sudeten 
German Agrarian Party and the Heimatfront, according to which Henlein had 
promised to restrain the leaders of his movement from recruitment activities in the 
Agrarianists stronghold, the rural villages16. Henlein had originally felt constrai-
ned to recognize the countryside as an Agrarian party preserve as a concession to 
Franz Spina, leader of the Agrarian party and Minister of Health in the Prague 
government. At a time when there seemed to be danger that the Czechs would 
dissolve the Heimatfront, Henlein needed Spina as a protector and an inter-
mediary, roles which Spina could well fulfill thanks to his high government post. 
By latě 1934, however, Henlein felt he no longer needed Spina, and as a con-
sequence, no longer needed to keep his Organizers out of the rural areas 1 7. And 
well he" might, for it was becoming clear that Henlein could get the samé things 
from the Czechs as he had from Spina — without a middle man and without 
the price of limiting expansion of the Heimatfront power base. 
Agroup of Czech politicians was courting Henlein at this time, including Viktor 
Stoupal, leader of the conservative Moravian wing of the Czech Agrarian Party. 
Stoupal hoped to win Henlein's support for a widely-based right-wing coalition 
which could sweep the more liberal Beneš faction out of control of the govern-
15
 The growth rate continued to decrease in špite of further Hitlerian success such as the 
Anglo-German Naval Agreement signed on June 18. W e i n b e r g : Foreign Policy 
210—216. 
1 6
 For a copy of the agreement, signed by Agrarian leader Wolfgang Zierhut and dated 
January 5, 1935, see SUA, Prague, 40 ~K.I-.II: 68. Apparently the original agreement was 
formalized sometime in mid-1934. See Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront document, „Ge­
dächtnisprotokoll. Verhandlung mit dem BdL [Bund der Landwirte or German 
Agrarian League]," dated September 17, 1934, i b i d e m . 
17
 Henlein had apparently held to the agreement for the most part, according to the Rum­
burger Zeitung, a north Bohemian paper traditionally close to the German Nationalist 
Party, March 27, 1935 (No. 73), p. 2. 
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ment. To this end, Stoupal offered Henlein both protection and money — a 
move which cut the ground from beneath the feet of the German Agrarians and 
made their agreement with Henlein superfluous18. As a result, the tenuous agree­
ment collapsed by December 1934 and Henlein party Organizers flocked into the 
countryside with rather sophisticated propaganda drawing peasants into the 
Heimatfront in considerable numbers1 9. By March 5 the youth Organization of 
the German Agrarian Party, the landständische Jugend, came over as a group to 
Henlein's party 2 0 . It was at precisely this time that the formation of Ortsgruppen 
accelerated so dramatically. The Heimatfront was clearly organizing, with dra-
matic success, in areas where it had not previously been active. 
At this samé time, another barrier of a different kind to the expansion of 
Henlein's movement was crumbling — that represented by the almost decade — 
long policy of „activism" on the part of several German political parties. In 
1926, after years of almost unanimous rejection of the Saisonstaat as the newly-
created Czechoslovakian statě was derisively labeled, Sudeten German parties 
had begun for the first time to také an active part in the Czechoslovak govern­
ment at the cabinet level. This new policy of collaboration with and respon-
sibility in the statě came to be called „activism"2 1. By 1935, however, after 
several years of disastrous economic crisis and depression which hit especially 
hard the mainly German populated, industrialized parts of Bohemia, many Sude­
ten Germans began to feel that their acceptance of and participation in the Czech 
statě was simply not bearing sufficient fruit to Warrant continuing such in involve-
ment 2 2 . Symptomatic of this disillusionment was a small, but clearly perceivable 
desertion from the ranks of those German parties which had most consistently 
pursued „activism". Already in June 1934, the so-called Rosche group, the former 
industrialist wing of the German Nationalist Party — which ironically had 
broken with the Nationalists in 1930 over that party's refusal to pursue activism 
1 8
 On relations between the Czech Agrarians and the Henlein party see Sudetendeutsche 
Heimatfront, „Hauptleitungsprotokolle" of February 2 and March 11, 1935, SUA, 
Prague, 40 K/://: 68; a slightly different version of the March 11 „Protokoll", SUA, 
Prague, 2 KKH/://: 6; and Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, October 19, 1934, National Ar-
chives Microcopy, T-120/3523 (hereafter NA/series/roll/frame number [not included 
in this particular roli]). 
19
 See Heimatfront campaign directive (Weisung) ://: 92, April 19, 1935, SUA, Prague. 
29 LV/://: 54. 
2 0
 For the agreement bringing the landständische Jugend into the Heimatfront, see SUA, 
Prague, 40 K/://: 68. 
2 1
 For a background on „activism" see B r u e g e 1 : Tschechen, chapters 8—9; also Z a j í ­
č e k , Erwin: Erfolge und Mißerfolge des sudetendeutschen Aktivismus. Beiträge zum 
deutsch-tschechischen Verhältnis im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Munich 1967, p. 127—142 
(Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum 19). 
2 2
 Despite this growing disillusionment, „activist" groups continued to funetion. In Fe­
bruary 1937 several Sudeten German political leaders (Jungaktivisten as they were 
called), dissatisfied with progress toward ending discrimination especially in the civil 
Service, made their demands known to the government. This was to be the last gasp of 
the policy of „activism". Certain concessions, such as the admission of additional Ger­
mans into the civil Service were made, but basically these measures were a case of too 
little, too late. See B r u e g e 1 : Tschechen 308—316. — Z a j i c e k : Erfolge 136—138. 
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— aligned itself with the Henlein party 2 3 . Now in early spring 1935, the Ger­
man Small Trader's Party (Gewerbepartei) went over to Henlein as well. For a 
time prior to this new alignment the Gewerbepartei had been politically adrift to 
some extent; nevertheless it had oriented itself more or less with the „activist" 
Agrarians. In the early part of 1935, however, this orientation began to waver as 
goodly numbers of Gewerbepartei members deserted the party and joined the 
Henlein movement. By April this exodus was so widespread that the whole party 
itself disappeared into Henlein's movement, further contributing to the flood of 
members into the Sudeten Heimatfront during early 19352 4. 
Henlein chose a course of action best guaranteed to exploit these crumbling 
barriers for the good of his own political movement. It was a time for skilled 
political maneuvering, for as elections approached in the spring of 1935, the 
Heimatfront was not only faced with the possibility of success; it also confronted 
an existence crisis of sorts. The threat of dissolution at the hands of the govern­
ment was still an ever present danger despite Spina's protection and there was 
much pressure on the government to force the Heimatfront to disband. Com-
pounding this was the related threat that the Front might be forbidden to take 
part in the elections at all — a ban which would in fact have gone into force but 
for the last minuté intervention of President Masaryk himself25. Had the ban 
gone into effect, Henlein would have been in an impossible dilemma. Forbidden 
from taking part in the political process, Henlein would have either had to 
commit himself entirely to a radical and at this point hopeless course of defying 
the authority of the statě or he would have had to accept the disintegration of his 
political movement. The tension arising out of this Situation was scarcely alle-
viated when the Henlein movement finally was allowed to put up candidates 
for the election: for permission was given on condition that Henlein change the 
name of his Organization from „Home Front" to „Party". This necessitated a 
great deal of expense in redoing campaign literatuře and posters already prepa-
red 2 6 . Thus, it was at a time of insecurity and adversity, not one of impending 
triumph that the first great influx into the Henlein party came 2 7. 
See B r u e g e 1 : Tschechen 182, 233; also Č e r n ý / C é s a r : Politika II, 42—43, 61, 
267. For a contemporary account see F o u s t k a , R.N.: Konrád Henlein: neoficielní 
historie jeho strany. Prague 1937, p. 36—37. See also Heimatfront Hauptleitungssitzung 
of October 23, 1934, where it was proposed that Rösche be coopted eventually into 
the directorship or Hauptrat of the party. SUA, Prague, 2 KKH/://: 6. 
See Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, April 17, 1935, PA, Pol. II/Politik 5/vol. 9, Innere Poli­
tik, Parlaments- und Parteiwesen; also Heimatfront memo, „Verhandlungsausschuß mit 
dem BdL", February 19, 1935, SUA, Prague, 40 K/://: 68. 
On Masaryk's decision to permit Henlein's party to take part in the elections, see Koch 
to Auswärtiges Amt, April 6, 1935, NA, T-120/3523. 
The forced name change of Henlein's party only generated more sympathy among 
Sudeten Germans. Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, May 2, 1935, PA, Pol. II/Politik 5/vol. 9, 
innere Politik, Parlaments- und.Parteiwesen. 
As the German Minister to Prague, Koch, reported to the Auswärtiges Amt: „As before, 
the Henlein movement finds itself not only in the vicissitudes of German-Czech ani-
mosities, but also in the perhaps more dangerous confusion of intramural Czech power 
politics", April 11, 1935, NA, T-120/3523. 
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The Henlein Front leadership functioned well as political tacticians during 
these months, both exploiting the decline of the German respectable Right and 
capitalizing upon the intermittent Czech persecution. In Februaty 1935, for 
example, during negotiations between the Heimatfront and the German Agrarian 
Party, Henlein suddenly brought up a proposal for the merger of both parties 
into one Organization. The Agrarians knew that given the much larger member­
ship of the Heimatfront, such a merger would mean the political demise of their 
party. Of course they brusquely rejected Henlein's offer. All this was then made 
public by Henlein which put the Agrarians in the uncomfortable position of 
appearing to be against ethnic unity. The result, undoubtedly foreseen by Hen­
lein's people, was a continued erosion of support for the Agrarians and a further 
exodus of members from their party 2 8 . Meanwhile, the Henlein leadership also 
succeeded in turning its difficulties with the Czechs to a political advantage. 
Appealing to the individual voter's resentment toward the Czechs for the at times 
very real economic discrimination against the Sudeten German population, the 
Henlein movement created just the right image needed to rally the Sudeten po­
pulace: an aura of intrepidness in the face of Czech persecution. Henlein's stance 
toward the statě, measured hostility combined with reluctant reasonability, was 
just the right combination to win him the maximum populär support without 
goading the Czechs into ending his political career. 
In the end, the election results — far from being a clear mandáte for irredenta 
— are rather symptomatic of a wavering and flux on the part of all sides in the 
Czechoslovakian political scene at this point. The respectable German Right, 
caught amid its commitment to „activism" and increasing public disillusionment 
with that policy, struggled between the contradictory demands of republican 
loyalty and militant völkisch allegiance. The Czechs, unable to decide whether to 
tolerate Henlein's movement or destroy it, vacillated between complete accep-
tance and total repression. Henlein himself placed the Sudeten German Party 
expediently if uncomfortably in a political stance somewhere between resistance 
to and collaboration with the ongoing regime: with a program vague enough in 
content not to bring down the wrath of the Czechs, yet militant enough in tone 
to attract the most disillusioned voter. For its part, the Sudeten German electo-
rate cast its lot with an uncompromised new political movement which was 
outspoken in expressing populär grievances and feelings of ethnic exclusivity, yet 
not so radical as to break totally with the ongoing political systém. In light of 
Sudeten party membership figures in 1935, it seems likely that it was primarily 
this combination of domestic factors which help explain the Henlein victory at 
the polls on May 19th — not any overwhelming support for irredenta, Hitler, 
or even Henlein himself. After all, while over a million voters sided with the 
Sudeten German Party in the election, only 370,000 had actually felt strongly 
enough about Henlein and his movement by this point to actually join the party 
itself. 
2 3
 Koch to Auswärtiges Amt, February 28, 1935, i b i d e m . Also Koch reports of March 15 
and March 26, 1935, i b i d e m , for generál flight from German Agrarian Party to 
Heimatfront at the grass roots level. 
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With the growth spurt in 1938, on the other hand, it seems more certain that 
it was foreign and not primarily domestic concerns which lay at the root of the 
Sudeten German Party success: for by 1938 the Sudeten problém had ceased to 
be essentially a Czech internal matter and had evolved into the object of inter­
national concern2 9. During latě 1935 and throughout 1936, membership in the 
Sudeten German Party tended to stagnate, at least when measured against the 
explosive growth of early 1935 — by December 1936 it had reached only 
460,000. This steady but hardly spectacular growth continued during 1937 with 
membership approaching 550,000 in December3 0. In the more than two years 
since the elections of 1935, only 180,000 names had been added to the Sudeten 
German Party rolls — a stark contrast to the growth spurt of over 200,000 in 
just several months during the pre-election period of 1935. In January 1938 
membership actually decreased slightly, by about 10,000, so that the total mem­
bers enrolled stood at 541,681. Then suddenly between February and June 1938 
membership shot into the sky, reaching a total of 1,347,903, an increase of nearly 
150 percent in four months 3 1 ! Allowing for those excluded from politics because 
of age and the small but dedicated minority of Sudeten Germans who remained 
loyal to other parties, the Henlein movement seems to have come very close to 
realizing the claims of totality implicit in the movement from its inception. By 
July 1938 nearly 40 percent of the Sudeten population had officially enrolled in 
the Henlein party 3 2 . 
Sometime between the growth spurt of 1935 and the one in 1938, a dramatic 
change appears to have taken place in the political climate in the Sudetenland. If 
the sudden growth of the party in 1935 had seemed dramatic, that of 1938 
appears volcanic by comparison and would seem to indicate not simply wholesale 
discontent but a genuine radicalization of the population. The smoldering discon-
tent — dissatisfaction which contributed to the gradual growth of the Henlein 
movement between 1935 and the end of 1937 — had been exacerbated by the 
continuing impression on the part of the Sudeten Germans that they were not 
being accepted by the Czechs as equal partners in the statě. Although the unrest 
may have been tempered somewhat by more favorable economic conditions in the 
German population areas, the slov/ pace of improvement, the perceived reluctance 
of the Czechs to permit visceral change, and of course the drama and prosperity 
of the Third Reich kept the pot boiling until outside events helped bring the by 
2 9
 On the internationalization of the Sudeten question, see S m c 1 s e r : Sudeten Problem, 
chapter VIL 
3 0
 The source for these and the following party membership statistics are Sudeten Ger­
man Party documents: „Hauptstelle Eger, Standesführung"; „Kreiszusammenstellung, 
1937", „Kreiszusammenstellung, 1938"; and „Hauptorganisationsamt, Abt. Mitglieder­
kartei", all four in SUA, Prague, 11-HS-STF/://: 24. 
3 1
 Sudeten German Party, „Hauptorganisätionsamt, Abt. Mitgliederkartei", SUA, Prague, 
11-HS-STF/://: 24. 
32
 The exact percentage is 38.70, using population totals for the Sudetenland calculated 
during a census made just after Anschluß in 1938. According to this survey, the Su­
deten German population was 3,408,449. Bundesanstalt für Landeskunde und Raum­
forschung, Sudetendeutsches Ortsnamenverzeichnis. Bad Godesberg 1965, p. 48. 
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now widespread distrust within the Sudeten population to the explosive point — 
to a mass appeal for irredenta3 3. The decisive point came in March 1938 when 
Austria joined the Third Reich. As a result, Germany was richer by eight million 
people, Czechoslovakia poorer by one indefensible frontier and the Sudeten Ger­
mans elated by what looked like an immediate Solution to the grievances and 
resentments they had nursed for so many years. It was in the ensuing months 
that Sudeten German Party membership shot over the million mark. 
By June 1938 the second huge surge of Henlein party growth once again 
slowed somewhat: „only" 30,295 new members joined the Sudeten movement in 
June 3 4 . This tapering off probably indicates that party membership was reaching 
the Saturation point by this time. But here again the membership pattern also 
seems directly linked to outside developments. By summer a kind of reaction 
apparently set in as a result of generál disappointment that the Sudeten Anschluß 
did not come immediately upon the heels of the Austrian one. At the same time 
there was some alarm about the Czech mobilization during the „weekend crisis" 
of May 30th 3 5 . 
Yet even in 1938 — given the massive impact of internationalization and the 
effects of the Austrian Anschluß — domestic factors continued, if in a subdued 
manner, to play a role in the way Henlein's party expanded. One indication of 
this is the nature of the party membership losses during this period. Alongside 
the enormous influx into the party, the number of Sudeten Germans who left the 
party seems miniscule indeed. From the beginning of 1937 to the period of great 
influx in March 1938 (the period for which such membership loss statistics are 
available), a total of 38,000 individuals left the Henlein party. Yet it is not the 
total number but rather the social composition of these members which is impor-
tant here. As Table 1 shows, the largest number of those leaving the Sudeten 
German Party were either workers or women. It should be noted that these loss 
figures are somewhat misleading in that without statistics pinpointing the total 
number or percentage of workers in the Henlein movement, it is impossible to 
ascertain to what extent the higher worker losses merely reflect a higher total 
percentage of workers in the party. Henlein's party did in fact appear to have 
a rather strong working class as well as a middle and lower-middle class base3 6. 
However, the exodus of workers from the party during the period of doldrums 
in late 1937 and early 1938 does seem more meaningful in light of other evidence 
that discontented grass roots labor elements within the Henlein movement were 
constantly at variance with the more bourgeois leadership of the party 3 7 . This 
deep seated social cleavage within the Sudeten German Party is one which was 
3 3
 On the somewhat improved economic Situation, see Č e r n ý / C é s a r : Politika II, 422 
footnote 31. 
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 Sudeten German Party, „Hauptstelle Eger, Standesführung", SUA, Prague, 11-HS-STF/ 
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 Eisenlohr (the German Minister to Prague who succeeded Koch in 1935) to Auswärtiges 
Amt, March 31, 1938, PA, Kult A/Inland IIg/226/vol. 7. 
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 For a discussion of the working class membership within the Henlein movement, see 
S m e 1 s e r : Sudetenproblem 136 f. 
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present in Sudeten Right wing politics as far back as the early days of the Sude­
ten National Socialist Party right after World War I 3 8 . As for the loss in women 
members, as a newly politicized group in society it is not surprising that they 
should also be among the first to become disenchanted when conditions were not 
propitious for party expansion. Together, the exodus of both groups suggest that 
until the Austrian Anschluß of March 1938 gave new, outside impetus to stimu-
late growth of the Henlein movement, the Sudeten German Party to the extent 
that it relied on domestic conditions was unable to rouše itself from a period of 
Stagnation in its expansion. 
The importance of domestic factors even so close to ultimate Anschluß also 
emerges in an analysis of the geographic distribution patterns of Henlein party 
membership in 1938. The Sudeten German Party, in its membership records, 
divided the Sudetenland into fourteen districts. It was on the basis of these 
districts that the party, in 1938, attempted to pinpoint percentage membership 
(Table 2). As one looks at the percentages for the various areas, one thing beco-
mes clear: the percentage membership of the Sudeten German Party is by no 
means uniform — it varies considerably from a high of 32.68 percent in District 
IV to a low of 12.87 in District XI . The average percentage membership for the 
Sudetenland as a whole in March 1938, before the big growth spurt had ended, 
is 25.4 percent3 9. The economic and social characteristics of these districts, as well 
as the proximity of the various areas to the Reich, all appear to have played a 
role in these differences in party growth. 
Five of the districts were clearly above average in their percentage Sudeten 
German Party membership in March 1938: Gablonz (32.68 percent), Karlsbad 
(30.56), Böhmisch-Leipa (28.85), Böhmisch-Krumau (26.72), and Trautenau 
(26.30). Four of these five (the exception is Böhmisch-Krumau) bordered directly 
on Germany; the three with the highest membership ratios also had a very close 
historical proximity to Germany. As western and northern Bohemian areas, the 
orientation of Gablonz, Karlsbad, and Böhmisch-Leipa had been traditionally 
toward Germany rather than toward Prague or Vienna. All three had been cen-
For details on the working class basis of the Sudeten German National Socialist Party, 
see the text of the original party program in C i 11 e r , Alois: Vorläufer des National­
sozialismus: Geschichte und Entwicklung der nationalen Arbeiterbewegung im deut­
schen Grenzland. Vienna 1932, p. 140—145; see also W h i t e s i d e , Andrew Gladding: 
Austrian National Socialism before 1918. The Hague 1962, p. 165 and 185. 
This figuře is radically different from the July 1938 per capita figuře of 38.70 used 
elsewhere in this study for a number of reasons: first, because the party did grow 
greatly between the time the Sudeten party made these calculations and the end of the 
1938 growth spurt in July; also because the Henlein statisticians computed their per­
centages on a smaller population base than the census figures used for July (3,408,449). 
The Henlein figures eliminate those Germans who lived in Slovakia who officially 
belonged not to the Sudeten German Party, but to the Karpathendeutsche Partei. Thus, 
the Sudeten German Party figuře for total „Sudeten" population is only 2,984,210. 
If one calculates the per capita Henlein party membership in July 1938 using the Su­
deten German Party population figures — i. e. totals for only those parts of Czecho­
slovakia where the party was officially active — rather than the total German popu­
lation of the country, as I have here in this study, then the resulting percentage is 45.16! 
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ters of rabid German nationalism for decades40. With Trautenau this had not 
been the čase although it bordered physically on Germany, and as a result, its 
membership figures — although above average — are only slightly so. At the 
opposite end of the scale, the two Sudeten districts with the lowest percentage 
membership were Znaim (15.25 percent) and Briinn (12.87 percent): two areas 
which were geographically and historically furthest from Germany. Both regions 
bordered on Austria and had traditionally been oriented toward Vienna, rather 
than the Reich. 
Statistics would seem to indicate, then, that one factor influencing membership 
in the Sudeten German Party was relative proximity of the election districts to 
Germany. The closer to Germany a district lay, or the closer its historie ties were, 
the more likely was the chance it would produce a higher percentage of Sudeten 
German Party members. Proximity to the Reich does not seem to be the only 
factor affecting party membership ratios, however. For if we consider those 
districts hovering at or around the overall average we found that of the four 
regions somewhat below average in party membership percentages, all four bor­
dered directly on Germany: Jägerndorf (24.59 percent), Teplitz (23.94), Marien­
bad (22.90), and Mährisch-Schönberg (19.27). While geographic and historie 
proximity to Germany was one important factor in Sudeten German Party 
membership growth, it was far from an exclusive determinant of party expan­
sion. 
Another conditioning factor in Sudeten German Party membership growth 
seems to have the relative f erocity of the Czech-German ethnic conf lict in the 
various districts. Here it is more difficult to provide any conclusive quantitative 
evidence, since national hatreds scarcely lend themselves to such rational measure-
ment. The Sudeten Germans kept a very close watch on what they felt were the 
shifting „fronts" which marked the borders between Czech and German settle­
ment areas and attempted to classify those areas likely to fall most easily to the 
enemy4 1. The ethnic conf lict appears to have been fiercest in those areas where 
the two ethnic groups were mixed, as for example in the coal mining towns of 
northern Bohemia, as well as along the language border itself. Moreover, an 
analysis of Sudeten party membership figures suggests that a correlation existed 
between the intensity of the ethnic struggle in any given area and the percentage 
of the Sudeten population that was drawn to the Henlein movement. For 
example, the Sudeten Germans felt that „The districts of Reichenberg and Ga­
blonz [were] biologically the weakest area of Sudeten Germandom" 4 2 . In this 
formerly exclusively German speaking area the Czechs had, as part of a generál 
exodus intó industrial areas, become a significant minority. The Karlsbad district 
4 0
 W i s k e m a n n , Elizabeth: Czechs and Germans. A Study of the Struggle in the 
Historie Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. 2nd ed. New York 1967, p. 137, 100— 
102, 99. 
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 An excellent example of this biological-military mind set is to be found in W a 11 e r , 
Gustav: Die Volksgrenze in den Sudetenländern. In: H e i s s , Friedrich (ed.): Die 
Wunde Europas. Das Schicksal der Tschechoslowakei. Berlin 1938, p. 195—229. 
4 2
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was also considered a hotly contested area: two of its cities, Karlsbad and Fal-
kenau, had the largest Czech minorities of any Sudeten German cities43. It is in 
these areas of intense ethnic competition — the Gablonz and Karlsbad districts 
— that there was the highest proportion of Sudeten German Party members, 
which would seem to support the theory that the intensity of the ethnic struggle 
was a Stimulus to party growth. 
Again, however, ethnic hostility cannot be ruled an exclusive determinant. 
Böhmisch-Krumau was above average in party membership, although the German 
birth rate was highest in this area and Czech „infiltration" negligible44. At the 
same time, the Teplitz district — with a slightly below average membership — 
was a hotly contested settlement area. In fact, two of the cities in the Teplitz 
area, Brüx and Dux in the coal mining region, came very close to having Czech 
majorities45. Znaim district with the second lowest party membership percentage 
of any district was considered by the Germans as a contested „front" in the 
ethnic struggle, while Brunn (the urban component of which had been „Czechi-
fied" by the annexation of surrounding Czech villages) had the lowest member-
ship percentage of all46. 
Party membership statistics suggest that a further factor influencing the growth 
of the Henlein movement was the disastrous economic Situation. Those areas 
which were most highly industrialized were those hardest hit by the depression 
and it was precisely in these areas of the Sudetenland where the growth of the 
Henlein movement was most pronounced. Gablonz district, with the city of Rei-
chenberg, had always been the center of the north Bohemian „luxury" industry, 
especially glassware and textiles. This area, particularly hard hit economically, 
had the highest percentage membership of any district47. The same pattern applies 
for the areas with the next highest percentage Sudeten party membership, Karls-
bad and Böhmisch-Leipa. Karlsbad had an overall unemployment rate of 35 to 
40 percent; it was in this district where 5 of the 12 Sudeten cities with the 
highest rates of unemployment were located48. Böhmisch-Leipa with its depressed 
brown coal mining and textile industry sustained an unemployment rate of 45 
percent49. By the same token, several districts with relatively low unemployment 
also show lower membership rates. Marienbad (22.90 percentage membership) 
had an overall unemployment rate of 15 to 20 percent, while Znaim with its 
fertile farmland and rural contours, only suffered from 5 to 20 percent un-
43
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employment. Znaim, as we have seen, had close to the lowest proportíon of its 
population in the Sudeten German Party. 
There is evidence, then, that relative proximity to Germany, relative ferocity 
of ethnic antagonism and relative economic decline all appear to have influenced 
growth of the Henlein party. The three factors seem to have worked together 
and seem to have been mutually reinforcing. Those districts with the highest 
membership rate (Gablonz, Karlsbad and Böhmisch-Leipa) were all close to Ger-
many, all suffered relatively worse economically than the rest of the Sudeten-
land during the industrial depression, and all were the scenes of intense ethnic 
conflicts. By the same token, the absence of one or two of these factors usually 
meant a significantly lower membership rate. In Znaim, with its close proximity 
to Austria and a rural profile relatively less affected by the depression, the per-
centage Sudeten German Party membership was quite low — despite relatively 
fierce ethnic antagonisms in the area. 
The Sudeten Germans themselves saw a connection between these factors. Un-
fortunately, they tended to see the relationship between the factors as causal, not 
merely reciprocal. It appeared to many Sudeten Germans that the Czechs were 
exacerbating the economic crisis as a weapon in the ethnic struggle against the 
Sudeten German population. Feelings of identification historically with the Reich 
and physical proximity to Germany only helped to strengthen this impression of 
being persecuted. If the Reich Germans had found a new prosperity under Hitler, 
then why could not the Sudeten Germans do as well were it not for the Czechs? 
Thus, the Sudeten German's perception of the problém itself added to the air of 
resentment pervading Czechoslovakian politics. 
But party statistics themselves undermine both such „Czech conspiracy" theo-
ries and contentions that the rise of Henlein's party was simply a function of 
Hitlerian success. On the one hand, the relationship of economic-geographic-
ethnic factors seems to have been reciprocal and not the result of Czech malevo-
lece as many Sudeten Germans maintained; on the other hand, only one of the 
three factors — geographic proximity — is directly related to Germany itself, 
suggesting that domestic considerations played a more important role in Sudeten 
discontent than many observers have been willing to admit. A closer examination 
of party membership patterns points even more to the validity of the more 
balanced interpretation: particularly if all three factors — geographic, economic 
and ethnic — are taken into account and related to the percentage membership 
in the various districts. 
Although no one of the three factors appears of overwhelming importance, one 
of the three seems to be somewhat more important than the other two: the eco-
nomic Situation. In all areas of Czechoslovakia but one where Sudeten German 
Party membership was average or above, the only consistent factor was severe 
economic dislocation. Where the other two factors — ethnic competition and 
proximity to the Reich — appeared influential, the difference between average 
and above average membership in any district seemed to hinge upon the relative 
percentage of agrarian and industrial concentration. The more agriculturally 
oriented a district was, i. e. the less the effect of the depression was perceptible, 
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the lower the percentage Sudeten party membership. The only exception to this 
was the district of Böhmisch-Krumau, with a slightly above average Sudeten 
German Party membership although the area bordered on Austria and although 
it was almost entirely agricultural economically. This apparent exception may be 
explained in part by the fact that the agriculture here was extremely primitive 
and low yielding and the conditions in some areas of the district virtually feudal. 
The German peasants in Böhmisch-Krumau, in contrast to Znaim for example, 
were scarcely able to eke out a living5 0. In short, in the čase of Böhmisch-Krumau, 
the agricultural economic base was not an indicator of relative prosperity as it 
was in the other districts. 
Still other evidence suggests that economic factors initially outweighed either 
the impact of ethnic competition or proximity to the Reich in the growth of the 
Henlein movement. Although both Marienbad and Mährisch-Schönberg bordered 
on Germany, both had a below average membership in the Sudeten German 
Party. It is significant that both were relatively better off economically than 
other parts of the Sudetenland5 1. In the čase of Mährisch-Schönberg, with the 
third lowest percentage membership, the ethnic animosities were less pronounced 
than elsewhere as well. 
To scholars interested in the complex tangle of Czech-German relations in the 
1930s and the development of the Henlein movement, then, Sudeten German 
Party membership statistics would seem to point to a number of conclusions: 
1) that initially domestic considerations rather than international events seem to 
have been more important in the growth of Henlein's support, particularly 
during the elections of 1935; and 2) that even later, during the massive influx 
into the party in 1938 when Hitler's successes were of such overwhelming im-
portance to political developments within Czechoslovakia, domestic condition 
still played a far from negligible role in the growth of Henlein's movement. 
Finally, considering the domestic factors involved, there is evidence that econo­
mic conditions tended to outweigh both feelings generated by geographic proxi­
mity to the Reich and ethnic hostility toward Czechs as factors luring Sudeten 
Germans into the Henlein movement. 
But more than this, the Sudeten party's growth patterns can be of significance 
in understanding the appeal and nature of political mass movements in generál. 
Particularly striking is that second massive growth wave of the Sudeten German 
Party which by the end of July 1938 brought membership totals to 1,347,903. 
Given the fact that the total Sudeten German population at this time was around 
3.5 million, this meant that by mid — 1938 virtually all the Sudeten Germans 
— apart from die-hard Democrats and Socialists and those too young or too old 
to be involved in politics — who could have joined Henlein's movement had 
doně so. The percentage is staggering. Something on the order of 40 percent of 
5 0
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the entire Sudeten German population was officially enrolled as members of the 
Sudeten German Party. The Nazi Party in Germany nevěr even remotely appro-
ached enrolling this high a percentage of the population in the ranks of the 
party 5 2 . 
The explanation for this astoundingly high percentage of party membership 
goes far beyond our immediate consideration of the relative weight of domestic 
Czech and international circumstances in the growth of the Henlein movement: 
it points unmistakeably to the diversified nature of modem mass parties, despite 
the similarities which often characterize them. Although the Henlein party was 
„German", dispite the fact that it functioned on territory in immediate proximity 
to Germany, and although it had many contacts with the Third Reich and 
borrowed a great deal of the style of the Hitlerian movement, the Sudeten Ger­
man Party nonetheless — in terms of its function and self-conceptualization — 
was far from being a filial of the Reich National Socialist Party. 
The National Socialist Party in Germany called itself and to some extent was 
a mass movement. One of Hitler's goals in forming the party was ostensibly to 
bridge the social antagonisms which beset the German nation statě — as seen in 
the name which he chose for his movement, the National Socialist German Wor­
kers Party. The party was intended as a rallying point for precisely those social 
groups and aspirations which were at greatest variance with one another: middle 
class nationalism and working class socialism. Eventually the party was to try, 
albeit unsuccessfully, to end those conflicts by seizing power and imposing the 
total power of the statě on German society. But despite this attempt at appealing 
to a broad populär base, the National Socialist Party always had a very strong 
elitist thrust. Before 1933 the party essentially saw itself as an Organization of 
„political soldiers" geared to seizing political power; after the Machtergreifung 
the party's self-image was that of cadres aimed at exercising power 5 3. The key 
to this elitist thrust lies to a great extent in the fact that for the National Socialist 
party the road to political power in Germany lay open, but only in ways not 
conducive to Volk unity. In its struggle for power, whatever its ultimate inten-
tions might have been, the National Socialist party had to temporarily exacerbate 
conficts within German society and found itself at variance with large segments 
of that society. As a consequence, the Nazi party tended to keep its ranks limited 
to politically commited fanatics, to „political soldiers" who were in a position to 
5 2
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assure the party of its ultimate goal. The party regarded itself as the vanguard, 
the embryo of a future greater Volksgemeinschaft or Community, and cultivated 
an atmosphere of exclusivity, of belonging, on behalf of the initiated. When the 
party had actually seized power, the focus changed somewhat. Still elitist in 
thrust, the party turned its energies to exercising power in the pursuit of goals 
once again not totally acceptable to the entire German populace. Despite an 
influx of „Me-too" members into the party, the so-called „March violets", the 
Reich National Socialist party remained not a macrocosmic, but a microcosmic 
folk community — an elitist function vis-a-vis a partly hostile, pardy politically 
uncommitted population. The party also consciously cultivated elitě formations 
within the party structure itself, elites within the larger elitě, to preserve the 
ideological purity and inner dynamism of the movement. Here, of course, the 
Sicherheitsdienst and the SS are prime examples5 4. 
The Sudeten German Party, on the other hand, nevěr exhibited this kind of 
elitist self-image vis-a-vis the rest of the population. It put no limits on the size 
of its membership. On the contrary, it opened its ranks to all and sundry. It 
tried to be the folk community or Volksgemeinschaft not in microcosm as the 
National Socialist Party had in the Reich, but macrocosmically by becoming as 
nearly contiguous with the whole Sudeten population as it could. The reason for 
this difference apparently lies in the very different context in which the two par­
ties had to operáte during their respective „years of struggle". Regardless of its 
claims on folk unity and its attempts to pull together disparate classes in society, 
the German Nazi party had to ultimately fight sizeable segments of the German 
populace in order to seize and hold power, which militated against mass folk 
unity and led to an elitist party stance. For its part, the struggle of the Henlein 
movement was not primarily within the Volk community itself. Rather, the party 
confronted an alien ethnic group which formed the majority in the statě. In this 
position the Sudeten German movement attempted to stress unity of the entire 
Sudeten population as a means of winning maximum political leverage in the 
statě — hence the name eventually chosen for the movement, the Sudeten Ger­
man Party. Although social bifurcation within the Sudeten community was very 
real, Henlein attempted to ignore these signs of dissention in his belief that the 
need to emphasize unity was so great that it would have been foliy to indulge in 
selective membership recruitment. So the Sudeten German Party recruited in-
discriminately and on a truly mass scale. 
This is not to say that the Sudeten German Party was entirely egalitarian in 
its thrust: much of the top leadership of the party did adhere to an elitist philo-
sophy, that of the Viennese sociologist Othmar Spann 5 5 . Spann had preached to 
a whole generation of young Sudeten Germans the glories of a restored German 
medieval impérium presided over by a neo-Platonic intellectual elitě, presumably 
5 4
 See, for example, B u c h h e i m , Hans: Anatomie des SS-Staates. 2 vols. Freiburg 
1965; and H ö h n e , Heinz: Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Gütersloh 1967. 
5 5
 For a summary of work on Spann, see S m e l s e r : Sudeten Problem 60—65; also, 
most recently, H a a g , John: ,Knights of the Spirit': The Kameradschaftsbund. Journal 
of Contemporary History 8 (July 1973) 133—154. 
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composed of his students. But several factors came into play which denied the 
Sudeten Spannist elitě any semblance of success which the Nazi elitě had enjoyed. 
The relatively large Nazi elitě operated within a movement which was circum-
scribed in size and composition and from this base was able to effectively mani-
pulate the masses. The Spann circle within the Sudeten German Party, by con-
trast, was a comparatively tiny, self-styled elitě operating clandestinely within a 
mass movement so large and unwieldy, so uncontrolled in size and composition, 
as to defy manipulation. Indeed, the history of the Sudeten German Party more 
often than not is a case of the tail wagging the dog 5 6 . Moreover, the role of the 
Spann circle as a popularly acceptable elitě was greatly diminished by the fact 
that the mass of Sudeten Germans who comprised the movement tended to see 
themselves as a kind of „mass elitě" vis-a-vis the culturally „inferior" Czech 
majority of the population. Hence the Sudeten population had a kind of cohe-
rency not present in Reich German society during the time prior to the Nazi 
Machtergreifung. Finally, the Nazi elitě was rewarded with so much success be­
cause in špite of the fact that it was an elitě, it thought in terms of the mass — 
in an age of mass politics. The National Socialist party leadership always was a 
political elitě of power brokers. The Spann elitě in the Sudeten German Party, 
on the other hand, tended to be an intellectual elitě, more used to manipulating 
ideas than people; indeed, Henlein and his closest circle of advisors nevěr got 
into the hábit of thinking in terms of mass politics. As a result, whereas the Nazi 
elitě rather skillfully used the masses, the Spann elitě more often than not found 
itself buffeted to and fro by grass roots pressure from within the Sudeten move­
ment itself. 
But even had the Spann elitě been larger and politically more astute, there is 
some doubt whether it would have been possible to steer the massive political 
force which this elitě had helped set in motion. The ultimate difference between 
the Sudeten German movement and the National Socialist movement in the Reich 
lay not merely in the self-images of the two parties, but in the relationship of the 
two movements to statě power. The German National Socialist Party — although 
frequently at odds with sizeable, if not hostile then at least indifferent, segments 
of the populace — was able to seize and hold political power. It is almost axio-
matic in politics that the less chance any political group has to hold or share 
power, the more likely it will be to dissipate its energies in hairsplitting ideolo-
gical debatě over often esoteric questions. The old Social Democratic Party in 
Wilhelminian Germany is one case in point. And so it was with the Sudeten 
German Party. Its stance for the most part was primarily negative and defensive, 
since there was no real chance of seizing total power in the Republic and since 
the party leadership had little desire to share power with the Czechs. Henlein 
tried to straddle the fence — professing loyalty to the Volksgemeinschaft but 
denying the only way he could really have created and steered such a movement 
effectively, by the use of statě power. 
S m e l s e r , Ronald: Reich National Socialist and Sudeten German Party Elites: a 
Collective Biographical Approach. ZfO 23 (1974) Heft 4. 
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This was the stalemate in which his party had become mired during 1937 and 
early 1938, when the influx into the Sudeten German Party largely abated. The 
Stagnation of membership growth bears witness to the failure of the Henlein 
movement to become anything on its own terms, to really achieve anythíng con-
crete. It was also during this period of mounting frustration and tension that 
Henlein gradually found himself unable to successfully cope with the exercise of 
political power within his own party and he began to turn increasingly to the 
Reich for aid in keeping dissidents within his movement in line. Unlike the pre-
election period in early 1935, this time the Henlein party had lost its drawing 
power in time of adversity. Finally, by November 1937, Henlein seems to have 
capitulated totally to Hitler in a desperate attempt to maintain his leadership 
role within the Sudeten movement5 7. The key to the future of the Volksgemein­
schaft now lay with Hitlerian Germany. I t is significant that only with Hitler's 
success in annexing Austria did Sudeten German Party membership agaín begin 
to climb dramatically. In October 1938, with the annexation of the Sudetenlánd 
itself, the use of statě power — something Henlein had attempted to bypass — 
came into play, but from outside and not from within Czechoslovakia. 
The German minister in Prague at one point offered this most perceptive 
assessment of Henlein's plight 5 8 : „Condemned in practice to be without in-
fluence, [the Sudeten movement] could offer its adherents — who are after all 
not just composed of idealists — little more than inflammatory speeches. Since 
an uprising against the overpowerful government was pointless, a seizure of 
power like [that of] the NSDAP in the Reich categorically impossible for a 
minority, the only hope left for excited and radicalized masses, who could see no 
concrete successes and no prospect for winning power, was an armed Intervention 
by Germany." 
Modern political parties, by their very nature and origin, must direct themsel­
ves toward statě power as their primary raison ďétre. Without accepting the statě 
there is no framework within which and no tool with which to exercise power. 
Henlein's movement did not accept the Czechoslovakian statě and discovered 
eventually that without a statě there could not be a politicized Volksgemeinschaft 
either. It was pardy that realization that prompted Henlein in the end to turn 
to the only other statě left to him: that of the Greater German Reich. It was 
something the expatriate Sudeten National Socialists had already doně years 
before. 
But in turning to the Reich for access to statě power, the Sudeten German 
movement found itself cheated Once again. For even inšide the Third Reich, it 
could not be the Volksgemeinschaft it had aspired to become. It found itself 
merged with a far larger community with interests often unlike its own — con-
flicting interests which were to take precedence over the needs of the Sudeten 
community. Nor could the Henlein movement really share power effectively 
5 7
 In a letter of capitulation written to Hitler on November 19, 1937, Henlein literally 
put his future and that of the Sudeten Germans in the dictator's hands. Akten zur deut­
schen Auswärtigen Politik, Series D (Baden-Baden, 1949), II, document 23. 
5 8
 Eisenlohr to Auswärtiges Amt, February 4, 1938, i b i d e m document 53. 
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after Anschluß. Its nature as a true mass movement — which, in terms of per-
centage membership at least it succeeded in becoming to a far greater extent than 
the German National Socialist Party — left it in no position to compete even 
on its own home ground with the power elite which directed Nazi Germany. The 
Sudeten leadership had already been manipulated by that elite during the crisis 
in 1938 which led up to Anschluß™. Now after 1938 the Sudeten German Party 
personnel — from Henlein on down — had to content themselves with honors 
and crumbs from the table of power. Henlein became a relatively powerless pro-
vincial Gauleiter. Many of his colleagues disappeared into obscurity; some were 
even persecuted. The Sudeten German Party itself was merged with the German 
National Socialist Party and disappeared as a separate entity00. 
One can perhaps conclude from the example of the Sudeten German Party 
that for „mass movements" to be politically viable, they must in reality include 
an elitist component whose task it is to steer the mass membership in a politically 
coherent direction. Although it appears important for this elite to continue to 
stress the „mass" nature of the movement to seeure the political power base, at 
the same time the masses cannot be allowed to stream indiscriminately into the 
movement itself. In a genuine „movement of the masses", finding and pursuing a 
common political goal becomes difficult and militates against what must be the 
ultimate aim of any political movement — gaining access to State power. Henlein 
failed to perceive this need*1. Even if he had recognized the problém, the diffi-
culty of combining the strong Sudeten demands for an elitist Volksgemeinschaft 
and the realities of limited access to State power may have made his venture an 
impossible one. In any case, the lack of political acumen on Henlein's part cannot 
and should not be mistaken for malevolent complicity with the Hitlerian regime; 
nor should the fact that Henlein at times attempted to imitate some of the flam-
boyant outward characteristics of the Hitlerian regime be construed as proof 
positive that the Sudeten German Party and the National Socialist parties of 
Germany and the Sudetenland were all one and the same. Henlein's successful 
appeal to a broad mass of the Sudeten population — at once a potential strength 
and, ironically, the ultimate downfall of the movement — argues dramatically 
for the uniqueness of the Sudeten party as a genuine „mass" movement and for 
Henlein's failure to understand the nature either of that movement or the decep-
tively similar movement across the border. In the end it was this very uniqueness 
which was to lead the movement into Hitler's hands: to make Henlein's „mass" 
movement susceptible to manipulation by the „mass-elite" party in Hitlerian 
Germany. 
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Chart 1 
Sudeten German Party Ortsgruppen Formation, 1933—1935 
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Sudeten German Party Membership Totals, 1933—1935 
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Table 1 
Sudeten German Party Membership Losses, 1937—1938 
Voluntary Cancellations, Expellees, Others Dropped 
Month Total Membership Lost, by Profession 
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Nov. 1937 942 136 142 
Dec. 1937 1,051 130 136 
Jan.1938 1,374 195 293 627 
Feb. 1938 1,344 186 183 304 
Mar. 1938 734 92 78 117 
Apr. 1938 405 57 51 76 
May 1938 382 65 69 105 
June 1938 360 92 91 90 
July 1938 570 127 180 109 
Total 7,162 1,080 1,223 
Source: Sudeten German Party, „Hauptstelle Eger, Abteilung Standesführung", SUA, 
Prague, 11-HS-STF/://: 24. Losses from charts labeled, „Streichungen: Einteilung 
nach Berufsgruppen". Total membership from „Standesführung" reports, by month. 
Table 2 
Percentage Membership of the Sudeten German Population 
in the Sudeten German Party, by District 
March 1938 
District Total Population Percent 
Membership German-speaking 
III (Trautenau) 36,248 138,042 26.30 
IV (Gablonz) 81,234 248,505 32.68 
V (Böhmisch-Leipa) 140,796 489,904 28.85 
VI (Teplitz) 86,928 363,302 23.94 
VII (Karlsbad) 160,435 524,837 30.56 
VIII (Marienbad) 59,294 257,908 22.90 
IX (Böhmisch-Krumau) 39,588 148,151 26.72 
X (Znaim) 19,766 129,631 15.25 
XI (Brunn) 18,052 140,237 12.87 
XII (Mährisch-Schönberg) 64,014 332,174 19.27 
XIV (Jägerndorf) 52,495 213,447 24.59 
Total 758,904 2,984,210 25.43 
Source: Sudeten German Party, „Hauptstelle Eger, Standesführung", SUA, Prague, 11-
HS-STF/://: 24. Report titled „Mitgliederstand mit Ende März 1938 errechnet 
nach den Bezirksberichten für Monat März 1938". Note: no information was 
given in party records on districts I, II and XIII . 
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A N D E N G R E N Z E N E I N E R M A S S E N B E W E G U N G : 
D E R F A L L D E R S U D E T E N D E U T S C H E N P A R T E I 
1933 B I S 1938 
Die Entwicklung der Henlein-Bewegung gibt uns die Möglichkeit, eine politi-
sche Massenbewegung in einem kleinen Lande zu untersuchen und die Bedeutung 
ihrer eigenständigen Natur angesichts des machtvollen Einflusses auf sie, durch 
eine ähnliche, aber größere Bewegung in einer nachbarlichen Großmacht, zu illu-
strieren. Sicherlich ahmte die 1933 gegründete Henlein-Bewegung in weitem Um-
fang den triumphalen Nationalsozialismus Hitlers auf der anderen Seite der 
Grenze nach und trat schließlich auch in seine Fußstapfen. Dies zu übersehen 
würde bedeuten, die Sudetendeutschen gänzlich aus dem Zusammenhang Mittel-
europas zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen lösen zu wollen. Aber bei allen Ein-
flüssen und Bezügen von Deutschland bleibt doch das kurze, meteorhafte Leben 
der Sudetendeutschen Partei unverständlich, wenn wir ihre böhmischen Zusam-
menhänge, in denen sie wirkte, ignorieren. Der kurzfristige Zugang zu Quellen in 
tschechischen Archiven machte Untersuchungen in diesem Zusammenhang möglich. 
Eine Analyse der Wachstumszahlen der Sudetendeutschen Partei (anfänglich 
Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront genannt), sowohl in bezug auf die Mitgliederzahlen 
als auch auf die Zahl der Ortsgruppen, ermöglicht Schlüsse auf die Anfänge und 
auf Gründe der Expansion. So zeigt ein Vergleich des plötzlichen Mitglieder-
wachstums unmittelbar nach Gründung der Bewegung im Oktober 1933 mit dem 
relativ langsamen Wachstum der Ortsgruppen, selbst über die folgenden Jahre 
hinaus, daß die organisatorische Basis der Partei nicht rasch genug der plötzlichen 
Popularität der Bewegung gerecht zu werden vermochte. Dieser Sachverhalt läßt 
Zweifel an der Meinung aufkommen, es hätten enge organisatorische Bindungen 
zwischen der alten DNSAP und ihrem gut ausgebauten Organisationsnetz und 
der nach der Auflösung gegründeten Sudetendeutschen Heimatfront bestanden. 
Einen weiteren Ansatzpunkt für eine Analyse bietet der Sachverhalt des plötz-
lichen Mitgliederanstiegs sowohl im Frühjahr 1935 als auch im Frühjahr 1938. 
Trotz der jahreszeitlichen Übereinstimmung erweist sich die Mitgliederexpansion 
von 1938 überwiegend als eine Auswirkung der internationalen Entwicklungen, 
speziell des Anschlusses von Österreich an Deutschland, während der plötzliche 
Mitgliederanstieg des Jahres 1935 weitgehend auf inländische Faktoren zurückzu-
führen ist: Eine allgemeine Enttäuschung über die Mißerfolge der deutschen akti-
vistischen Parteien bei der Überwindung der sich verstärkenden Wirtschaftskrise, 
die zu einer Schwächung der gemäßigten Rechten (Agrarier, Gewerbepartei, 
Christlich Soziale) führte, die Belebung der organisatorischen Aktivitäten der 
Henlein-Partei und ein allgemeiner Protest gegen alle Maßnahmen, die als eine 
Verfolgung durch die Tschechen empfunden wurden. 
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Diese Faktoren illustrieren die Bedeutung der einheimischen Ursachen bei dem 
Wachstum der Henlein-Bewegung im Jahre 1935. Aber selbst im Jahre 1938, als 
das Emporschnellen der Mitgliederzahl deutlich als Ergebnis der internationalen 
Erfolge Hitlers zu werten ist, übten heimische Ursachen weiterhin einen wichti-
gen, wenngleich sicher nicht mehr entscheidenden Einfluß aus. Einen wichtigen Nach-
weis für diese Situation bietet eine Analyse der ansteigenden Mitgliederzahlen in 
den 14 Wahlbezirken des Sudetenlandes. Obwohl die relative Nähe zu Deutsch-
land, und zwar sowohl geographisch wie historisch, für jeden Distrikt ein wichti-
ger, die internationale Lage widerspiegelnder Einflußfaktor ist, zeigt sich doch, 
daß auch der Grad des tschechisch-deutschen Volkstumskampfes und die unter-
schiedliche Intensität der Wirtschaftskrise in diesen Distrikten von großer Bedeu-
tung gewesen sein müßte. Tatsächlich erweist sich von den drei Faktoren die wirt-
schaftliche Bedrängung als ein Schlüsselfaktor für die unterschiedlichen Prozent-
sätze der Mitgliedschaften bei der Sudetendeutschen Partei in den verschiedenen 
Gebieten. 
Schließlich zeigt eine Analyse der Expansion der Partei neben der Bedeutung 
der einheimischen Ursachen für das Wachstum der Henlein-Bewegung auch viel 
über die grundsätzliche, vielgestaltige Struktur und äußere Erscheinung dieser 
Massenbewegung. Hier wird erneut das eigenständige Gefüge der Sudeten-
deutschen Partei deutlich. Trotz äußerlicher Ähnlichkeiten zwischen Henleins SdP 
und der NSDAP während der Jahre ihres Kampfes in Deutschland, sind einige 
grundlegende Unterschiedlichkeiten nicht zu übersehen. 
Da die NSDAP während ihrer Kampfzeit nicht sicher sein konnte, eine Mas-
senbewegung zu sein, die die vielen unterschiedlichen Elemente der deutschen Ge-
sellschaft einschließt, war das Ziel der ihren Kern bildenden verschiedenen, inein-
andergreifenden Eliten darauf geriditet, die Massenbasis einzuengen, zu kon-
trollieren und zu manipulieren. Auf diese Weise konnte die NSDAP gut fundiert 
und koordinierend wirken. Im Gegensatz dazu wurde die Sudetendeutsche Partei 
durch verschiedene widerspenstige und streitsüchtige, cliquenhafte Gruppierungen 
geleitet. Hier fehlte ein dynamischer Führer, der imstande gewesen wäre, die 
leitende Hierarchie zu koordinieren. So tendierte die Sudetendeutsche Partei einer-
seits dazu, sich auf einer viel breiteren Basis und letztlich viel weniger diskrimi-
nierend zu ergänzen als dies bei der NSDAP der Fall war. Andererseits bewirkte 
dies aber, daß keine dynamisch geführte Partei entstehen konnte, sondern viel-
mehr eine Partei, in der die Führerschaft durch geringsten Druck hin und her ge-
rissen wurde. Im Gegensatz zu der NSDAP, die sich als eine kleine Avantgarde 
der kommenden Volksgemeinschaft empfand, versuchte die SdP mit ihrer verhält-
nismäßig viel größeren Mitgliederzahl eine Volksgemeinschaft im Großen zu 
schaffen, indem ihre Gefüge möglichst mit der Bevölkerung übereinstimmen sollte, 
die sie repräsentierte. Diese Pluralität der Henlein-Bewegung machte es den er-
fahrenen Machtvertretern des Dritten Reiches viel leichter, die sudetendeutsche 
Massenbewegung schließlich zu manipulieren und für ihre Zwecke zu mißbrau-
chen, als dies bei einer andersgearteten Struktur möglich gewesen wäre. 
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